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I. INTRODUCTION
Missouri has recently joined a minority of jurisdictions that refuse to
apply the doctrine of comparative fault to strict products liability actions.'
Because Missouri courts refused to apply contributory negligence to products
liability cases 2 and comparative fault was adopted as a substitute for con-
tributory negligence, 3 comparative fault was similarly denied application to
products liability cases. 4
A majority of the Missouri Supreme Court believed the policy of spread-
ing the losses caused by defective products- outweighed competing policies
supporting comparative fault. Comparative fault promotes fairness and jus-
tice by reducing a plaintiff's recovery to the extent that his own carelessness
contributed to the injury, as well as instilling in product users a motive to
be more careful.6
1. Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., 715 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
2. Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969) (en banc).
3. Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
4. Lippard, 715 S.W.2d at 492-93.
5. Id. at 492.
6. Id. at 493.
1
et al.: Comparative Fault and Products Liability
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1987
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
Jurisdictions are split as to the applicability of comparative fault to
products liability actions.7 The majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue
have applied some form of comparative fault to products liability actions.8
This Comment will address the policy considerations involved in order to
analyze the wisdom of the Lippard court's approach to this hotly debated
area of the law. 9
7. The following jurisdictions have applied comparative fault or comparative
negligence to strict products liability: Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr.
& Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977) (federal admiralty case); Butaud v.
Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (1979); Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575
P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d
80 (Fla. 1976); Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 65 Haw. 447, 654 P.2d 343 (1982);
Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire Co., III Idaho 536, 726 P.2d 648 (1985); Coney v. J.L.G.
Indus., 97 Ill. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983); IowA CODE Am. § 668.1 (West Supp.
1986); Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788 (1980); Bell v. Jet
Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1964);
MrcH. CoMt. LAWS § 600.2949 (1986); Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d
377 (Minn. 1977); Zahrte v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 203 Mont. 90, 661 P.2d 17 (1983);
Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978); Suter v. San
Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); Marchese v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 100 N.M. 313, 670 P.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied,
100 N.M. 259, 669 P.2d 735 (1983); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976);
Mauch v. Mfr. Sales & Serv., 345 N.W.2d 338 (N.D. 1984); Wilson v. B.F. Goodrich
Co., 292 Or. 626, 642 P.2d 644 (1982) (en banc); Baccerelli v. Hyster Co., 287 Or.
3, 597 P.2d 351 (1979) (en banc); McPhail v. Municipality of Culebra, 598 F.2d 603
(1st Cir. 1979) (applying Puerto Rico law); Fiske v. MacGregor, 464 A.2d 719, (R.I.
1983); Norman v. Fisher Marine, Inc., 672 S.W.2d 414 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984);
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984); Mulherin v. Ingersoll-
Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981); Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149
(3d Cir. 1979) (applying Virgin Islands law); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4.22.005-
.015 (Supp. 1987); Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W.
Va. 1982); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
The following jurisdictions have refused to apply comparative fault or compar-
ative negligence in strict products liability cases: Kinard v. Coats Co., 37 Colo. App.
555, 553 P.2d 835 (1976). But see Welch v. F.R. Stokes, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1054 (D.
Colo. 1983) (interpreting CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-21-406 (Supp. 1986)); Correia v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 388 Mass. 342, 446 N.E.2d 1033 (1983); Melia v. Ford
Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976) (applying Nebraska law); Young's Mach.
Co. v. Long, 100 Nev. 692, 692 P.2d 24 (1984), NEv. REv. STAT. § 41.141 (1985);
Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., No. L-84-125, slip op. at - (Ohio Ct. App., Feb. 9,
1987); Kirkland v. Gen. Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974); Bike v. Am.
Motors Corp., 101 F.R.D. 77 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (predicting Pennsylvania law); Klug
v. Keller Indus., 328 N.W.2d 847 (S.D. 1982); Smith v. Smith, 278 N.W.2d 155 (S.D.
1979).
8. See supra note 7.
9. An example of the enthusiasm with which this topic is discussed can be
seen in Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., 715 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. 1986) (en banc), where a
spirited dissent accuses the majority of disregarding the "long-standing principles of
justice and fairness" by refusing to apply comparative fault in products liability cases.
[Vol. 52
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II. Two STEPs FoRWARD - ONE STEP BACKWARD
The combination of comparative fault with strict products liability has
reversed a significant trend in tort law.' 0 Comparative fault and strict prod-
ucts liability were both adopted to improve the position of plaintiffs. Com-
parative fault allows a negligent plaintiff to recover a percentage of his
damages where contributory negligence would have denied any recovery."
Strict products liability eases the burden of proof and limits the availability
of defenses such as contributory negligence.'
2
When these two pro-plaintiff doctrines are combined, however, the plain-
tiff's recovery is often reduced.' 3 A negligent plaintiff will be denied recovery
of damages for which he is at fault whereas previously his negligence would
not have been a defense. This reversal in our tort law system was created
through providing manufacturers with a defense they were previously denied
- the negligence of the plaintiff." Courts like the Lippard court feel the
substitution of comparative fault for contributory negligence should not af-
The dissent further characterizes the opinion as "just legal gobbledy-gook." Id. at
503 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
10. Carestia, The Interaction Of Comparative Negligence And Strict Products
Liability - Where Are We?, 47 INs. CouNs. J. 53, 70 (1980).
11. Id. at 70-71.
12. Id. at 71.
13. Id. There are instances where a court's adoption of comparative fault
improves the plaintiff's chances for recovery. In many jurisdictions, misuse as well
as an unreasonable and voluntary assumption of the risk were a complete bar to
recovery in products liability cases prior to the adoption of comparative fault. By
adopting comparative fault, these total bars were converted into partial defenses,
thereby improving a plaintiff's chances for at least a partial recovery. See authorities
cited infra at note 32, where many acts of ordinary contributory negligence are still
no defense at all, but what was formerly a total bar, such as assumption of risk, is
converted to a partial defense by the adoption of comparative fault in products
liability cases.
These jurisdictions have varied from the approach of Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978), the leading case adopting
comparative fault in products liability cases. This article primarily addresses the policy
ramifications of the Daly approach which permits all negligent conduct by the plain-
tiff (even that which previously would not have been a defense in a products liability
case) as a partial defense, (see infra note 30 and accompanying text), as compared
to the Lippard approach (prohibiting the use of a plaintiff's ordinary negligence as
even a partial defense in products liability cases).
Unless otherwise stated, this article, when referring to the plaintiff's negligent
or careless conduct, refers to ordinary negligence such as a negligent failure to discover
a risk or negligent failure to guard against a risk or foreseeable misuse of a product.
These activities did not constitute a defense according to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRTs § 402A comment h, n (1965), but have been converted into partial defenses
by Daly and its progeny.
14. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965).
19871
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fect the status of products liability law.' 5 The majority of courts and com-
mentators, however, argue that this combination furthers the basic goal of
tort law-the fair and equitable compensation of injured parties.' 6
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Strict products liability is a doctrine designed to spread among all con-
sumers the losses suffered by a few individuals.' 7 Manufacturers increase
their prices to account for the potential losses they will incur when consumers
are injured by their products. The manufacturer is a better risk-bearer not
only because he can shift the loss, but also because, unlike consumers, he
has the power to correct any defects.' This doctrine is also designed to create
an incentive beyond the demands of the market for manufacturers to produce
safer products.' 9 Additionally, this doctrine relieves the injured consumer of
the difficult burden of proving that the manufacturer of a defective product
was negligent.20
15. See, e.g., Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., 715 S.W.2d 491, 492-93 (Mo.
1986) (en banc); Young's Mach. Co. v. Long, 100 Nev. 692, 692, 692 P.2d 24, 25
(1984); Kirkland v. Gen. Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1367 (Okla. 1974).
16. See supra note 7; see also Carestia, supra note 10, at 71; V. SCHWARTZ,
COMPARATivE NEGLIGENCE § 12.1, at 195 (1974); Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses
Based on Plaintiff's Conduct, 12 UTAH L. RFv. 267, 284 (1968); Levine, Buyer's
Conduct as Affecting The Extent of Manufacturer's Liability in Warranty, 52 MINN.
L. REV. 627, 652-63 (1968).
17. Fischer, Products Liability - Applicability of Comparative Negligence, 43
Mo. L. REv. 431, 432 (1978); Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for Product
Design and Manufacture, 52 TEx. L. REv. 81, 82-84, 87-88 (1973); Wade, On the
Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 826 (1973).
18. See, e.g., Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 736, 575 P.2d
1162, 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 386 (1978); Carestia, supra note 10, at 68.
19. See Fischer, supra note 17, at 432; see generally Holford, supra note 17;
Wade, supra note 17.
20. See Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 736-37, 575 P.2d at 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386;
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 463, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring) ("An injured person, however, is not ordinarily in a position
to refute such evidence or identify the cause of the defect, for he can hardly be
familiar with the manufacturing process as the manufacturer himself is."); Gershon-
owitz, Comparative Causation As an Alternative To, Not a Part of, Comparative
Fault in Strict Products Liability, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 483, 503 (1986); Carestia,
supra note 10, at 68.
The doctrine of strict products liability does not require that the plaintiff prove
that the manufacturing steps were unreasonable; this would be too difficult (see
authorities cited above in this footnote). The plaintiff's burden is instead directed at
the product itself. The reasonableness of the manufacturer's process in creating this
product is not at issue. Strict products liability allows the plaintiff to attack the nature
of the product without having to attack the reasonableness of the manufacturing
process, a process familiar only to the manufacturer himself. Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at
463, 150 P.2d at 441.
[Vol. 52
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Weighed against these policies is the countervailing interest in not im-
pairing the operation of useful businesses. 2' By requiring manufacturers to
meet unreasonably exacting standards of safety in order to further the goals
of consumer protection, strict products liability laws could force socially
appealing businesses out of the market. When fashioning rules of liability
designed to protect product users, this potential ramification must be con-
sidered. 22
Competing with these policies are those underlying comparative fault.
While products liability laws encourage the spreading of losses among all
consumers, comparative fault advocates the notion that losses caused by a
plaintiff's own carelessness should not be shifted from him to the rest of
society. 23 Fairness requires that a plaintiff's recovery be proportionately re-
duced by the amount of his fault in relation to that of the defendant.24
In addition, by providing consumers with an incentive to act carefully,
the comparative fault doctrine provides manufacturers with a safeguard against
injured plaintiffs who refuse to protect themselves. 25 While products liability
21. See Fischer, supra note 17, at 432.
22. Id. Professor Fischer explains this problem by using the automobile in-
dustry as an example. Imposing liability on automobile manufacturers for all the
injuries caused by cars is consistent with the consumer protection policies discussed
above. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text. However, such a rule of law
could spell the end of the auto industry because of the prohibitive increase in costs
that would result. If the industry then attempted to pass these costs on to consumers,
the vast majority of consumers would be priced out of the automobile market. Such
a result is not in the best interest of society. Products liability law, Professor Fischer
explains, has avoided making manufacturers insurers of all harm caused by their
products (as the above example illustrated) by setting legal limits which must be
satisfied before a manufacturer is required to compensate an injured consumer. This
limitation requires, at a minimum, a showing that the product was defective and that
this defect caused the plaintiff's injury. See infra note 49, discussing the uncertainty
regarding exactly what is required in Missouri to allow recovery.
It is this risk of destroying otherwise useful business that in part determines how
many hurdles an injured consumer must leap before the manufacturer will be found
liable. Absolutely no hurdles would make the manufacturer an insurer, which could
be disasterous for business. On the other hand, too many hurdles, such as requiring
the plaintiff to prove the manufacturing process used was unreasonable (see supra
note 20 and accompanying text), would seriously inhibit the consumer protection
goals stated earlier. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Gershonowitz, supra note 20, at 485; Carestia, supra note 10,
at 61.
24. See Fischer, supra note 17, at 431. It is frequently asserted that this is
what juries have commonly done anyway, contrary to the judge's instructions. Id.
Codifying that which juries have been doing promotes respect for the law because
now juries will be doing as the court tells them. Id.
25. Gershonowitz, supra note 20, at 486 (citing Epstein, Products Liability,
the Search For the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. REv. 643, 658-59 (1978) (because the
manufacturer is powerless to control what the plaintiff may do, the plaintiff's conduct
1987]
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laws provide manufacturers with an incentive to make safe products, man-
ufacturers are virtually powerless to prevent injuries if the plaintiff is un-
willing to protect himself. 26
The debate on this issue stems from the incompatible nature of the
policies behind each doctrine. 27 In products liability the general concept is
one of spreading losses by forcing the manufacturer to bear the risks. 2
Contrarily, comparative fault is designed to prevent the shifting of certain
losses away from the plaintiff because the plaintiff's conduct did not meet
the standard required by society. 29
IV. VARIous APPROACHES
Different jurisdictions have adopted various approaches to this problem
depending on which policy considerations they deemed the most persuasive.
Some jurisdictions apply comparative fault in all strict liability cases with no
limitations based on the level of the plaintiff's culpability. 30 At the other
must be considered)). But see W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 67, at 469 (5th ed. 1984) (contributory negligence does not promote caution by
making the plaintiff responsible for his own safety and therefore does not reduce the
number of accidents).
It could be argued that contributory negligence, and to a lesser degree compar-
ative fault, actually increase the number of injuries if defendants think they can
escape the consequences of their negligence. Id. See also Gershonowitz, supra note
20, at 486 n. 17. With this in mind, manufacturers may produce unsafe products they
otherwise may not have produced.
26. See Gershonowitz, supra note 20, at 486; cf. Twerski, The Use and Abuse
of Comparative Negligence in Products Liability, 10 INrD. L. REv. 797, 799 (1977)
(Professor Twerski believes that if the policy behind products liability law is to
encourage the manufacturing of safer products, it is inappropriate to bar plaintiff's
recovery because of plaintiff's unreasonable conduct).
27. Carestia, supra note 10, at 61.
28. Id.; see supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
29. Carestia, supra note 10, at 61; Twerski, supra note 26, at 799; see supra
notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (1979) (fault includes any
act, omission, conduct, or risk assumed); Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d
725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978) (the leading case on the use of com-
parative fault in strict products liability); Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 65 Haw.
447, 654 P.2d 343 (1982) (adopting the Daly approach); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.1
(West Supp. 1986) (fault includes any negligent act, unreasonable assumption of risk,
misuse or unreasonable failure to avoid an injury); Jaramillo v. Fischer Controls Co.,
102 N.M. 614, 625, 698 P.2d 887, 900 (Ct. App. 1985) (plaintiff's failure to exercise
ordinary care is a defense); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976) ("culpable
conduct" includes all types of contributory negligence, including failure to discover
a defect or guard against its existence, foreseeable misuse and assumption of risk.
See H. WOODS, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: ComPARATrVE FAULT 534 (1978)); Fiske v.
MacGregor, 464 A.2d 719, 728-29 (R.I. 1983) (goes beyond Daly by maintaining
[Vol. 52
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extreme are courts which have refused to apply comparative fault principles
in strict liability cases at all." Between these extremes are two intermediate
approaches. One category of cases specifically excludes as a defense the use
of a plaintiff's negligence which consists solely of a failure to guard against
or discover the defect which caused the injury.32 There are numerous other
approaches jurisdictions have adopted when applying comparative fault prin-
ciples to products liability cases which do not fall into any particular cate-
gory.
33
assumption of risk as a total bar, but adds as a partial defense all other types of
negligence, even those that were not defenses previously, such as a negligent encounter
with a risk); WAsH. REV. CODE §§ 4.22.005 -.015 (Supp. 1987) (fault includes any
negligent act, including unreasonable failure to avoid an injury. Section 4.22.005
specifically states that the comparative fault rule applies "whether or not under prior
law the claimant's contributory fault constituted a defense"); Ransome v. Wisconsin
Elec. Power Co., 87 Wis. 2d 605, 275 N.W.2d 641 (1979) (defenses include contrib-
utory negligence, misuse, abuse or alteration of products, and assumption of risk).
31. See, e.g., Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., 715 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Mo. 1986)
(en banc) (the Missouri law on products liability remains unchanged and a plaintiff's
contributory negligence is not at issue); Young's Mach. Co. v. Long, 100 Nev. 692,
693, 692 P.2d 24, 25 (1984); Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., No. L-84-125, slip op. at
- (Ohio Ct. App., Feb. 9, 1987); Saupitty v. Yazoo Mfg. Co., 726 F.2d 657 (10th
Cir. 1984) (applying Oklahoma law); Smith v. Smith, 278 N.W.2d 155 (S.D. 1979).
32. See Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1985) (plaintiff's failure
to excercise ordinary care was not sufficient to raise the defense of comparative fault
in a products liability case; only the defenses of assumption of risk and misuse were
allowed as partial defenses); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 92 (Fla.
1976) (the ordinary negligence of the plaintiff is a defense except for the failure to
discover a defect or guard against its existence); Simpson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 108
Ill. 2d 146, 152, 483 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1985) (failure to discover a defect or guard against
its danger is no defense; misuse and assumption of risk are converted from a total
defense to a partial defense); Austin v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 471 A.2d 280,
285-86 (Me. 1984) (failure to discover and failure to guard against a defect are no
defenses; assumption of risk is a partial defense; misuse was purposely not addressed);
Holm v. Sponco Mfg., 324 N.W.2d 207, 213 (Minn. 1982) (allowed partial defenses
of misuse, assumption of risk and contributory negligence, except for failure to
discover or guard against a defect); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry and Mach. Co.,
81 N.J. 150, 158, 406 A.2d 140, 144-45 (1979) (plaintiff's negligence a defense except
for the failure to discover or guard against a defect; assumption of risk only a partial
defense; misuse not termed a defense but rather a factor to negate causation or the
existence of a defect); Mauch v. Mfr.'s Sales and Serv., 345 N.W.2d 338, 347 (N.D.
1984) (ordinary contributory negligence is not a defense); Sandford v. Chevrolet Div.
of Gen. Motors Corp., 292 Or. 590, 598, 642 P.2d 624, 628 (1982) (fault includes
all kinds of negligent conduct except the "kind of unobservant, inattentive, ignorant
or awkward failure to discover or to guard against the defect").
33. See, e.g., ARuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2509 (Supp. 1986) (If product
liability claim is based on strict liability in tort and negligence, all contributory neg-
ligence is a defense; if the claim is only in strict liability, contributory negligence is
no defense); McIlwain v. Moser Farms Dairy, Inc., 40 Conn. 230, 488 A.2d 102
(1985) (similar to the Arizona statute above); Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 111 Idaho
19871
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After a jurisdiction has adopted comparative fault in products liability
cases, it must still decide what the jury is to compare. Jurisdictions vary on
this issue as well.3 4 Some compare the level of culpability, just as in any
negligence case." Some commentators feel that because the defendant's fault
in strict products liability cases is based on a defective product rather than
a wrongful act, courts should compare the degree of defectiveness of the
product with the plaintiff's fault.36 Other commentators have stated that a
jury should only look at the plaintiff's conduct without comparing it at all,
reducing the plaintiff's recovery in accordance with the culpability of his
conduct.37 This approach avoids the problems inherent in comparing the
dissimilar concepts of strict liability and negligence, while still maintaining
a degree of fairness by reducing a plaintiff's recovery to the extent his care-
lessness contributed to his injury.38 Still others feel that causation should be
compared. 39
536, -, 726 P.2d 648, 653 (1985) (allows only the defenses of misuse and voluntarily
and unreasonably proceeding in the face of a known danger); Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast,
462 So. 2d 166, 171-73 (La. 1985) (court refused to delineate what types of conduct
would constitute a partial defense, but stated only that misuse and assumption of
risk were included. As to other conduct, the lower courts were instructed to determine
if the type of conduct in question is such that application of comparative fault would
serve to provide any greater incentive to consumers to guard against injury, or whether
reducing the claim would only serve to defeat the basic goals of strict products
liability); Mauch v. Mfr.'s Sales and Serv., 345 N.W.2d 338, 347 (N.D. 1984) (or-
dinary contributory negligence is not a defense in a products liability action but
unforeseeable misuse and assumption of the risk will be partial defenses); Duncan v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984) (the Texas approach is quite in-
volved; for an excellent explanation of the intricacies of this jurisdiction's comparative
fault law see H. WOODS, supra note 30, at 566-71). Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,
628 P.2d 1301, 1303-04 (Utah 1981) (the court only addressed the application of
misuse and stated that misuse will no longer be a total bar but rather only a partial
defense; the court, however, refused to address the role of extreme unforeseeable
misuse breaking the causal chain, or misuse so foreseeable that the manufacturer had
a duty to anticipate it).
34. Gershonowitz, supra note 20, at 502; Twerski, supra note 26, at 805.
35. See, e.g., Butaud v. Suburban Marine and Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d
42, 46 (Alaska 1976) ("The comparative negligence defense would be applied in the
same manner as in any negligence case, with the major difference being that in
products liability cases it would not be necessary to prove that a defect was caused
by negligence."); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460-61, 155 N.W.2d 55, 64-65
(1967) (stating in dictum that comparative negligence applies because strict liability
is negligence per se). But see Fischer, supra note 17, at 442-43 ("social fault in
marketing defective products still has nothing in common with the type of specific
culpability required for contributory negligence. The concepts can not be compared
rationally.").
36. See, e.g., Wade, supra note 17, at 377 (the product is "bad" because it
was not safe enough).
37. Twerski, supra note 26, at 806; Fischer, supra note 17, at 449-50.
38. Fischer, supra note 17, at 449-50.
39. See, e.g., Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 111 Idaho 536, -, 726 P.2d
[Vol. 52
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V. JUSTIFICATION OF Lippard v. Houdailles Indus.4°
A. Setting Up the Problem - Competing Policies
The vast majority of jurisdictions that have adopted comparative fault
have applied it to strict products liability. 41 Why then did the Missouri Su-
preme Court in Lippard refuse to join this growing movement? In Lippard
the plaintiff operated a planing machine as part of his employment. The
blades of the machine were protected by a metal guard which was designed
to close after the board being planed had cleared the cutterhead. A board
slipped out of the plaintiff's hand, and he reached down to catch it as it
fell. The guard plate had not covered the blades as it should have, and two
of the plaintiff's fingers were severed.4' The trial court and court of appeals
allowed a comparative fault defense and reduced the plaintiff's recovery by
fifty percent, the percentage of fault the jury attributed to the plaintiff's
negligence. 43 The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed, holding that the plain-
tiff's contributory negligence was not at issue in a products liability case.
44
Missouri's products liability law did not permit contributory negligence
as a defense. 45 Therefore, when Missouri replaced contributory negligence
with comparative fault,46 it treated comparative fault the same way and
refused to allow the plaintiff's negligence to serve as even a partial defense.
47
648, 653 (1985); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 118 N.H. 802, 810, 395 A.2d
843, 848 (1978); Mauch v. Mfr.'s Sales and Serv., 345 N.W.2d 338, 348 (N.D. 1984);
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 432 (Tex. 1984); Gershonowitz,
supra note 20, at 507-15.
For an analysis of the reasoning of the jurisdiction cited in this note, see Carestia,
supra note 10, at 64-68.
40. 715 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
41. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
42. Lippard, 715 S.W.2d at 492.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 493.
45. See Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Mo. 1969);
see also Uder v. Missouri Farmers Ass'n., 668 S.W.2d 82, 87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
Missouri, like the vast majority of jurisdictions, adopted the RESTATFMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 402A, wherein comment n states that contributory negligence
amounting to a failure to discover a defect or to guard against its existence is no
defense.
46. See Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
47. Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., 715 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
There was not complete agreement among the Missouri Supreme Court Judges
on this issue. Judge Welliver in his dissent stated that Gustafson was controlling in
products liability cases even though Gustafson was a negligence case. Lippard, 715
S.W.2d at 500-01 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
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This decision is justified by more than an adherence to precedent which
prohibited the defense of ordinary contributory negligence.48 Missouri's po-
sition regarding products liability is one of strongly encouraging the social-
ization of losses caused by defective products.4 9 Because Missouri has
48. Many jurisdictions which now allow comparative negligence in products
liability cases were faced with the same precedent. Precedent should not be sufficient
grounds to retain bad law. See, e.g., Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725,
742, 575 P.2d 1162, 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 390 (1978) (judicially adopting com-
parative fault in strict products liability cases for all types of contributory negligence
despite precedent prohibiting the use of contributory negligence in products liability
cases); Henderson v. Harnischfeger Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 663, 672, 527 P.2d 353, 358,
117 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 (1978); see also Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at 11-16, where the
existence of precedent mandating alI-or-nothing contributory negligence did not pre-
vent this court from adopting comparative fault.
49. See Lippard, 715 S.W.2d at 493; Keener, 445 S.W.2d at 364. Recent
developments in Missouri's products liability law indicate a strong policy in favor of
compensating consumers injured by products so as to socialize their losses. According
to Missouri Supreme Court Judge Donnelly, Missouri's movement toward compen-
sating injured plaintiffs began when this court expanded the Keener holding to include
design defects. See Blevins v. Cushman Motors, 551 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. 1977) (en
banc). Next, in Elmore v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 673 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. 1984) (en
banc), the court "effectually excised the words 'unreasonably dangerous' from the
products liability cause of action. Lippard, 715 S.W.2d at 498 (Donnelly, J., dis-
senting). Most recently, the court in Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707
S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1986) (en banc), according to Judge Donnelly, "effectually excised
the words 'use reasonably anticipated"' from the products liability equation. Lippard,
715 S.W.2d at 498 (Donnelly, J., dissenting).
This movement toward encouraging the socialization of plaintiffs' losses may
be capsulized by comparing the Missouri Approved Instructions (MAI) for products
liability in 1969 when Keener was decided with what Judge Donnelly expects after
Nesselrode in 1986. After Keener, MAI 25.04 read as follows:
Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe:
First, defendant sold the (describe product) in the course of defendant's
business, and
Second, the (describe product) was then in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous when put to a reasonably anticipated use, and
Third, the (describe product) was used in a manner reasonably anticipated,
and
Fourth, plaintiff was damaged as a direct result of such defective condition
as existed when the (describe product) waS sold.
In Judge Donnelly's opinion, based on the decision in Nesselrode, MAI 25.04
would read as follows:
Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe:
First, defendant sold the (describe product) in the course of defendant's
business, and
Second, the (describe product) was then in a defective
condition * * *, and
Third, the (describe product) was used ** *, and
Fourth, plaintiff was damaged as a direct result of such defective condition
as existed when the (describe product) was sold. Lippard, 715 S.W.2d at
498 (Donnelly, J., dissenting).
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consistently opted for a rule of law which expands the availability of products
liability compensation, it cannot be surprising' that the Lippard court also
rejected a defense that would serve to reduce an injured plaintiff's recovery,
a defense that had previously been unavailable. 2
Mere consistency, however, does not make the Lippard decision correct.
To justify the decision in Lippard requires one to conclude that Missouri's
policy toward socializing losses arising from defective products, or its other
policies supporting its strict products liability law, outweigh the competing
policies which support the doctrine of comparative fault.53
B. The Real Issue
The inescapable question opponents of the Lippard decision must answer
is why the substitution of comparative fault for contributory negligence
should mandate reducing a plaintiff's recovery in cases where prior to this
switch, the plaintiff's ordinary contributory negligence had no impact on the
plaintiff's recovery.5 4
When comparative fault was first adopted in Gustafson, the Missouri
Supreme Court stated that fairness and justice are best achieved by elimi-
nating the all-or-nothing doctrine of contributory negligence and replacing
it with comparative fault.5 5 The Gustafson court reasoned that relieving a
negligent defendant of all responsibility (as contributory negligence did) was
no better than relieving a negligent plaintiff.5 6 Opponents of the Lippard
50. See supra note 49.
51. See Lippard, 715 S.W.2d at 497 (Donnelly, J., dissenting) (stating that
prohibiting the comparative fault defense in products liability "came as no surprise").
52. Lippard, 715 S.W.2d at 492-93.
53. Another competing policy that must be considered is the need to prevent
putting socially useful manufacturers out of business by making them insurers of all
who use their products. Although this topic is outside the scope of this article, see
supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text for a brief discussion.
54. This is not to say that the plaintiff's conduct was irrelevant in Missouri.
The defendant could make use of the plaintiff's carelessness to support arguments
that the product was not unreasonably dangerous. Lippard, 715 S.W.2d at 493.
Furthermore, the plaintiff's negligence can bar recovery in Missouri to the extent that
it amounts to extreme unforeseeable misuse that breaks the causal connection between
the defect and the injury, or an unreasonable and voluntary assumption of risk. Id.;
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A comments h, n (1965). This article is pri-
marily addressing negligence which was no defense in products liability cases prior
to the adoption of comparative fault, namely the negligent failure to discover or
guard against a defect and foreseeable misuse. See supra note 13.
55. Gustafson v Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
56. Id. at 13 (quoting H. WooDs, Trn NEGLIGENCE CASE: CoMPARATIVE FAULT
14-15 (1978)). The Gustafson court also justified comparative fault because it would
simplify multi-defendant litigation by encouraging the joining of all concerned parties
in one trial to determine everybody's percentage of fault. This was not only simpler,
but it relieved the congestion of overcrowded courts. Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at 14.
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decision argue that plaintiffs are now being relieved of responsibility despite
their negligence, contrary to the expressed policy in Gustafson17 They argue
that the policy behind Gustafson is just as strong in products liability cases
as it is in pure negligence cases and therefore negligent plaintiffs in products
liability cases should not be permitted total recovery.58
As appealing as this argument may appear, it does not answer the orig-
inal question. Products liability is significantly different from ordinary neg-
ligence.5 9 Just because "fairness and justice" require the adoption of
comparative fault in negligence cases does not explain why it should be
adopted in strict products liability cases where the plaintiff's negligence has
never been a defenseA° The remainder of this Comment will address this
question.
C. Comparative Fault - Is It the Perfect Compromise? Daly v. General
Motors Corp.61
California was one of the first states to combine comparative fault with
strict products liability. California, like Missouri, prohibited the use of the
ordinary negligence of the plaintiff, short of voluntary and unreasonable
assumption of risk, as a defense in products liability. 62 California, like Mis-
57. See Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., 715 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
"The importance of fairness and justice that prompted this court to adopt compar-
ative fault in Gustafson, is no less compelling in the strict products liability setting."
Id. at 502 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
58. Id.
59. See Fischer, supra note 17, at 433-35.
60. See supra note 54 (explaining the limited role a plaintiff's negligence plays
in strict products liability in Missouri).
The dissent in Lippard argued that Gustafson adopted the entire Uniform Com-
parative Fault Act (UCFA) as law in Missouri. The UCFA states that comparative
fault shall be applied in strict liability cases. See UCFA § l(b), 12 U.L.A. Supp. 35-
40 (1983); Lippard, 715 S.W.2d at 500 (Welliver, J. dissenting). There are two re-
sponses to this. First, even if Gustafson did adopt comparative fault for strict products
liability, it still does not answer the question whether Missouri should do this. Second,
the majority in Lippard expressly stated that Gustafson did not enact the UCFA as
a virtual statute in Missouri. Lippard, 715 S.W.2d at 492-93.
The Gustafson opinion, according to the Lippard majority, was only adopting
the procedures of the UCFA "insofar as possible." Id. at 493. The Lippard majority
held that the UCFA was not intended to be binding on substantive issues not then
before the Gustafson court. Id. at 493 n.1. The court concluded that the language
"insofar as possible" did not include applying the UCFA to strict products liability
cases when Gustafson was only a negligence case. Id.
61. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1978).
62. See, e.g., Henerson v. Harnischteger Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 663, 672, 527 P.2d
353, 358, 117 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 (1978). Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 145, 501 P.2d
1163, 1169-70, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443, 449-50 (1972).
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souri, judicially adopted pure comparative fault for negligence claims.6 3
Unlike Missouri, however, California felt the adoption of comparative fault
justified the consideration of the plaintiff's negligence in products liability
cases despite their refusal to do so under the prior doctrine of contributory
negligence.6 4
Daly combined these doctrines to promote the equitable allocation of
losses among all parties in proportion to their fault without thwarting the
expressed purposes underlying strict products liability6 5 The Daly court saw
an opportunity to get the best of both worlds and seized it. Daly asserted
that the goals of strict products liability can be achieved while still preventing
defendants and society from shouldering responsibility for damages flowing
from the fault of plaintiffs.1 In other words, Daly and its progeny see the
doctrines of comparative fault and strict liability as allies.67 It should be
noted that this is inconsistent with the earlier analysis which concluded that
the two doctrines were in competition with each other.
8
In essence, Daly and its progeny are of the opinion that the policies of
fairness and justice furthered by the adoption of comparative fault in place
of the all-or-nothing approach of contributory negligence compel courts to
consider the plaintiff's negligence as a partial defense in cases wherein it
previously was prohibited as a defense.6 9 Comparative fault, according to
these jurisdictions, can be combined with strict liability without sacrificing
the goals of strict liability, whereas this was not the case with the all-or-
nothing approach of contributory negligence. The policy of encouraging safer
products and socializing losses by putting the risk of loss on the manufacturer
would be substantially impaired if a manufacturer were completely exoner-
ated anytime the consumer was negligent.70 By granting only partial relief,
according to Daly, strict liability goals stay intact.71 Or do they?
63. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 810, 532 P.2d 1226, 1230, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858, 862 (1975).
64. Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 742, 575 P.2d 1162, 1172,
144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 390 (1978).
65. Id. at 737-38, 575 P.2d at 1168-69, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387-88.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 733, 575 P.2d at 1166, 144 Cal. Rptr. at
384; Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 65 Haw. 447, 654 P.2d 343 (1982); Fiske v.
MacGregor, 464 A.2d 719, 728-29 (R.I. 1983); Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power
Co., 87 Wis. 2d 605, 618, 275 N.W.2d, 641, 647 (1979); WAsH. R-v. CODE ANN. §
4.22.005 (Supp. 1987). In each of these cases, the courts recognized that contributory
negligence as a total bar was no defense, but allowed its successor, comparative fault,
to act as a partial defense.
70. See, e.g., Twerski, supra note 26, at 799 (It is inappropriate to bar the
plaintiff's recovery because of plaintiff's unreasonable conduct if the policy behind
19871
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D. The Dangers of the Daly Approach
1. Frustration of Product Liability Policy Interests
Courts following the Daly rationale are subject to several attacks. Con-
trary to Daly, the application of comparative fault in products liability cases
may very well reduce the manufacturer's incentive to produce safer products.
It has been argued that "once a product with a design defect has been
marketed, we know with substantial certainty that there will be a victim-
we just do not know his name." '7 2
One can imagine a situation where a manufacturer is faced with a choice:
should I spend X dollars to make this product safer or should I simply pay
out the verdicts as they arise when consumers are injured? 73 This decision
will turn on how much the manufacturer feels he will be forced to pay out
for injuries. If the injured consumers consistently have their damages reduced
because of comparative fault, the manufacturer's injury exposure is also
reduced. This thereby lowers the threshold level where a manufacturer will
choose to market a product without investing more money to improve its
safety. His product will now be more dangerous than if he were threatened
with higher damage awards. As a pure business decision, the lower his dam-
age exposure, the less money the manufacturer will spend improving a prod-
uct's safety in order to avoid potential injuries. 74
Professor Twerski argues that allowing the reduction of a plaintiff's
award because of plaintiff's misconduct will also frustrate the safety policy
by no longer encouraging the development of "anti-contributory negligence
mechanisims." 7 Even Daly-type jurisdictions admit that it is the manufac-
strict products liability is to encourage the manufacture of safer products.).
By completely barring plaintiff's recovery despite the manufacturer's contribu-
tion to the injury, the socialization of plaintiff's loss is non-existent. With comparative
negligence, at least that part of the loss attributable to the manufacturer is socialized.
See Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 736-37, 575 P.2d at 1168-69, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386-87.
71. Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 736-37, 575 P.2d at 1168-69, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386-
87.
72. Twerski, supra note 26 at 800. Professor Twerski used the safety guard
cases as an example. He stated that, "if a drill press is designed without a safety
guard, there is little question that somewhere in the manufacturing community there
will be a plaintiff who is destined to have his hand severed." Id. See generally Dorsey
v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60
N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972); Owen, The Highly Blameworthy Manufacturer: Im-
plications on Rules of Liability And Defense In Product Liability Actions, 10 IND.
L. REv. 769 (1977).
73. Twerski, supra note 26, at 802.
74. Id; see also Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 764, 575 P.2d
1162, 1186, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 404 (1978) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
75. Twerski, supra note 26, at 804.
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turer's duty to make safe products and products liability laws are designed
to encourage this policy. If the product is defective in some way, society
places responsibility for injuries resulting from this unsafe product on the
manufacturer. 6 A manufacturer should be required to design products which
prevent injury to even negligent consumers if this negligence is foreseeable.7
In this way the safety interests are significantly furthered. Though the man-
ufacturer cannot control how the plaintiff will use the product, he can design
the product to prevent the plaintiff from unwisely misusing it.71 These "anti-
contributory negligence mechanisims" have become commonplace today. Ex-
amples include simultaneous buttons on a stamping machine requiring both
hands to be on the buttons before the stamp will lower,79 safety shields which
lower once wood has entered the system of a cutting press, 80 and warning
beepers on heavy equipment which sound when the vehicle is in reverse. 81
If comparative fault were applied in these cases it would be penalizing
the plaintiff for acting unreasonably when that was the very problem the
manufacturer was to guard against.Y2 Safety designs such as those enumerated
above should be fully encouraged. The fact that they are in place today is
a testamentary to the effectiveness of our products liability law-which tra-
ditionally disallowed contributory negligence as a defense. To now exonerate
manufacturers (even partially) in these cases because the plaintiff acted un-
reasonably is, as Professor Twerski states, to "march up the hill in order to
march down again." '8 3
76. See, e.g., Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 736-37, 575 P.2d at 1168-69, 144 Cal. Rptr.
at 386-87; Butaud v. Suburban Marine and Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 44
(Alaska 1976).
77. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A comments h, n (1965).
Comment h states that generally misuse of a product will bar recovery, but where
that misuse is reasonably anticipated the manufacturer may be required to take ad-
ditional precautions. Comment n states that even a plaintiff who acts negligently by
failing to discover a risk or failing to guard against its occurrence can still recover
from the manufacturer. See also Twerski, supra note 26, at 804.
78. See supra note 77.
79. This design prevents a plaintiff from activating the stamping press with
one hand while the other hand is still in danger. Without this mechanism, a worker
who stamped his hand would have his recovery reduced because it is arguably un-
reasonable to stamp your own hand. Because this risk is foreseeable, we should require
manufacturers to guard against its occurrence.
80. See Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., 715 S.W.2d 491, 492 (Mo. 1983) (en
banc).
81. See West v. Caterpiller Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 82 (Fla. 1976); Bac-
celleri v. Hyster Co., 287 Or. 3, 5, 597 P.2d 351, 352 (1979) (en banc).
82. Twerski, supra note 26, at 805.
83. Id. See James, Assumption of the Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE
L.J. 185 (1968). This restates the argument set out in Parvi v. City of Kingston, 41
N.Y.2d 553, 560; 362 N.E.2d 960, 965, 394 N.Y.S.2d 161, 166 (1977), warning that
permitting affirmative defenses and causation arguments may destroy the duties the
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Allowing reduction in damage awards because of plaintiffs' foreseeable
misconduct does not create a full duty of safety but something less than
law has worked so hard to develop. See also Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d
725, 764, 575 P.2d 1162, 1186, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 414 (1978) (Mosk, J., dissenting)
(the Daly decision "seriously erodes the pattern of law which up to now reflected a
healthy concern for consumers victimized by defective products.").
Proponents of the use of comparative fault in strict liability would be quick to
point out that the manufacturer is still liable and is therefore still encouraged to
manufacture safe products. The fact is, however, that they are not liable to the same
degree. Justice Mosk, in his Daly dissent, addressed this issue by stating: "The
motivation to avoid polluting the stream of commerce with defective products in-
creases in direct relation to the size of potential damage awards." Daly, 20 Cal. 3d
at 764, 575 P.2d at 1186, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 414. Furthermore, as Professor Twerski
has argued, allowing comparative fault as a defense gives juries the opportunity to
tear down the duty requirements our law has placed on manufacturers by grossly
reducing the plaintiff's award. These proponents must be willing to accept the fact
that their approach delegates major law-making responsibility to juries. See Twerski,
supra note 26, at 813; see also Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 756-57, 575 P.2d at 1181, 144
Cal. Rptr. at 399 (Jefferson, J., concurring and dissenting).
As was noted earlier, it is often asserted that before comparative fault was
adopted, instead of totally barring the plaintiff's recovery due to his contributory
negligence, juries merely reduced the recovery, thereby ignoring the court's instruc-
tions. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. Opponents of the Lippard decision
may argue that juries will similarly continue to ignore the instructions given and
reduce the recovery in products liability cases as well. Therefore, the argument goes,
by not allowing the comparative fault defense, the Missouri Supreme Court is fooling
itself because juries will continue to reduce awards due to the plaintiff's negligence
anyway.
However, a significant difference exists between what juries formerly did with
contributory negligence instructions and what juries will do with the products liability
instructions after Lippard. With contributory negligence, the jury was instructed to
deny recovery if the plaintiff's negligence in any way contributed to his injury. In a
products liability case after Lippard, however, the jury will not be instructed on the
plaintiff's ordinary negligence. The plaintiff's conduct is only at issue if it amounts
to an unreasonable assumption of risk, extreme misuse that breaks the causal con-
nection, or a showing that the product is not defective. See supra note 54. The jury
will not be instructed to consider ordinary negligence that falls short of these, such
as failing to discover a defect. Evidence pertaining to the plaintiff's "ordinary"
negligence will probably be excluded.
The only acts of negligence these instructions (and often times the evidence at
trial) allow the jury to focus on go beyond mere unreasonableness. As a result, a
juror will not be tempted with the choice of reducing the recovery because the plaintiff
merely failed to use ordinary care. The juror will not be tempted because no instruc-
tion will be given directing the jury's attention to penalizing the plaintiff for any and
all unreasonable acts. This is significantly different from the contributory negligence
instructions which forced the jury to focus on any negligent act by the plaintiff.
The distinction is subtle but crucial. An example should help. Suppose defendant
manufacturer designs a stamping press which only requires one button to be pushed
before the stamping head lowers. Such a design makes it extremely likely that during
a busy day a worker will inadvertently press the button before his other hand has
cleared the stamping head and thereby seriously injure himself. Suppose a plaintiff
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that.8 4 There are those who argue that comparative fault provides plaintiffs
with an incentive to act more carefully. This, however, misses the point. As
Professor Twerski stated: "[T]he short answer to [this] argument is that the
defendant's safety device would have eliminated plaintiff misjudgment, a
goal which the law should foster totally, not partially." '
Some have argued that the heart of product liability litigation arises out
of products failing to perform to the level expected by consumers.16 The way
a consumer treats a product is a reflection of the marketing techniques used
by manufacturers and sellers.8 7 When a defendant encourages certain kinds
of plaintiff behavior which increases sales, he should not be allowed to use
this same behavior as a defense when the product malfunctions.88
This reasoning applies whether the plaintiff's wrongful conduct is a total
bar or only a partial defense. Either way, jurisdictions permitting the use of
does exactly this. After Lippard, the jury will not be instructed to consider the
plaintiff's alleged negligent failure to guard against this risk because the plaintiff's
conduct arguably did not amount to an unreasonable assumption of the risk, it did
not amount to an extreme misuse of the product, and his conduct did not amount
to a showing that no defect existed. With no instruction focusing the jury's attention
to the plaintiff's conduct, the jury will not be tempted to ignore the court's instruc-
tions and penalize the plaintiff for his alleged ordinary negligence.
Only if the evidence presented makes a submissible case that the plaintiff's
conduct amounted to one of the enumerated defenses will the jury be told to focus
on the plaintiff's conduct. However, even in such a situation, the instructions would
require the jury to look beyond mere reasonableness and instead consider the act
only insofar as it affects causation, the existence of a defect or an unreasonable
assumption of risk. The jury will not be told to punish the plaintiff merely because
his unreasonableness contributed to his injury.
This significantly differs from the former contributory negligence instructions
which required juries to consider not only any negligent acts by the plaintiff, but
also to punish the plaintiff based solely on this unreasonable act. After Lippard,
juries will not be asked to punish plaintiffs for unreasonableness. They will instead
be told to punish plaintiffs only if one of the above mentioned defenses existed. As
a result, the risk of juries ignoring the court's instructions and improperly reducing
recoveries is significantly reduced.
84. Twerski, supra note 26, at 813.
85. Id; see also Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 756, 575 P.2d at 1181, 144 Cal. Rptr. at
399 (Jefferson, J., concurring and dissenting).
86. Twerski, supra note 26, at 803-04; Shapo, A Representational Theory Of
Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability For Product Dissap-
pointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109, 1370 (1974).
87. Twerski, supra note 26, at 803.
88. Id. Note that the conduct encouraged by the defendant need not be the
exact behavior the consumer was involved in when the product malfunctioned for
this theory to apply. For example, if a tire manufacturer advertises that its tires are
excellent at handling high speed turns, and the tire malfunctions when the consumer
is going 70 mph down a straightaway, the defendant has encouraged high speed
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plaintiff's misconduct as a defense are frustrating a fundamental policy of
compensating consumers who are injured by products that fail to meet the
standards the defendant has impliedly held them up to meet.
The detrimental effect the Daly approach will have on the socialization
of losses, perhaps the primary reason the Lippard court declined to follow
Daly, must not be overlooked. In addition to the earlier analysis given on
this issue,8 9 further arguments will be made at the conclusion of this Com-
ment.0
2. Additional Dangers of Daly
Other criticisms have been wielded against combining comparative fault
and strict products liability that have nothing to do with furthering the policy
considerations of strict products liability. By far the most often raised crit-
icism is the "apples and oranges" argument. That is, it is logically impossible
to compare a plaintiff's negligence with a manufacturer's strict liability.9
This criticism is especially compelling when one considers the second
non-policy criticism of combining these two doctrines, namely, the inability
of juries to apportion fault between a plaintiff's negligence and the defend-
ant's defective product. 92 The end result of a jury's search for some common
denominator to compare will be a verdict prejudicial against the plaintiff. 9
The jury is instructed to compare the plaintiff's fault with the defend-
ant's conduct in a cause of action that does not require that the jury consider
the existence or nature of the defendant's culpability. 94 The jury is asked to
find the defendant's product defective, irrespective of fault, then turn around
89. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
91. This article is devoted primarily to discussing the policy implications of
combining comparative fault with strict products liability. As a result, issues such as
the "apples and oranges" debate, though fuel for much scholarly discussion, wil not
be discussed in depth. For excellent discussions on this issue, see Gershonowitz, supra
note 20, at 501-07; Fischer, supra note 17, at 433-36; Twerski, supra note 26, at 805-
08.
92. See, e.g., Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976) (applying
Nebraska law); Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 751, 575 P.2d 1162,
1178, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 396 (1978) (Jefferson, J., concurring and dissenting); Smith
v. Smith, 278 N.W.2d 155, 161 n.7 (S.D. 1977).
This criticism obviously overlaps with the "apples and oranges" criticism. Be-
cause one cannot mix apples and oranges, a jury cannot compare them. But scholars
treat the "apples and oranges" argument on a purely theoretical level and find it
repugnant without ever considering the difficulty juries will find with it. See author-
ities cited supra note 91.
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and compare the plaintiff's fault with the defendant's. Because the defend-
ant's fault has not been emphasized in the litigation (because it is strict
liability), the jury may not be aware of any "fault" by the defendant. So
comparing this with the plaintiff's fault, which the defendant has emphasized,
will likely result in an unjust apportionment of fault. 95
Professor Twerski argues that plaintiffs are prejudiced in that manu-
facturers producing defective products are really intentional tortfeasors, be-
cause "once a product with a design defect is marketed, we know with
substantial certainty [somebody will be injured]. ' 96 Yet the "absoluteness"
of the injury is hidden from jurors in the "one-on-one setting" of a trial. 97
The plaintiff may well be prohibited from demonstrating how the defendant's
conduct has hurt others,98 and even if some evidence of this kind is admis-
sible, the courts will not permit the plaintiff to depict the danger inherent
in the product outside the parameters of this one-on-one setting.99 The true
egregiousness and dangerousness of the product's design is hidden from ju-
rors. Instead they are innundated with alleged negligent acts by the plaintiff
which they are to consider in total ignorance of the other consumers this
defendant's product has injured. Because the culpability of the plaintiff and
the defendant cannot fairly be compared, they should not be compared at
all.10o
95. See, e.g., Buccery v. General Motors Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 549,
132 Cal. Rptr. 605, 615 (1976) (there may be no negligence of the defendant to
compare with that of the plaintiff). See also Fischer, supra note 17, at 433-34.
96. Twerski, supra note 26, at 800-01; supra note 72 and accompanying text.
97. Id.
98. Id. L. FRum:ER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LiABLTrry § 12.01(2) (1976);
Morris, Proof of Safety History in Negligence Cases, 61 HAv. L. Rv. 205 (1948).
99. Twerski, supra note 26, at 801.
100. The counter argument is usually made that juries can make these com-
parisons because jurisdictions that have applied it have experienced no difficulties.
See, e.g., Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., 97 Ill. 2d 104, 116, 454 N.E.2d 197, 202 (1983);
Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 65 Haw. 447, 463, 654 P.2d 343, 353; Butaud v.
Suburban Marine and Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 45 (Alaska 1976).
Because juries have come back with verdicts apportioning fault between plaintiff
and defendant does not answer the question of whether juries can fairly apportion
fault in these cases. To say juries can do it because they are doing it fails to address
the prejudicial effects discussed in the text above. All this argument states is that the
courts are accepting these prejudicial verdicts.
The courts are simply refusing to address this question. A typical example is
Kaneko, where the court cited three cases and a law review article which argued that
juries cannot fairly compare strict liability and negligence, and then cited Daly and
its progeny for the proposition that because those jurisdictions have found no dif-
ficulty for jurors, the two theories could be merged. Kaneko, 654 P.2d at 353. No
analysis at all was given. The court ignored articulate arguments supporting a contrary
position and instead held that because jurors have returned verdicts in other juris-
dictions it must be working fairly. This reasoning is not persuasive.
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is now apparent what may have gone through the minds of the Mis-
souri Supreme Court Judges when a majority held in Lippard that compar-
ative fault was not to be considered in products liability cases. Or perhaps
none of these arguments were needed-they simply followed the precedent
of Keener which prohibited the defense of contributory negligence in products
liability.1°1
The strong policy in favor of socializing losses attributable to defective
products which Missouri supports' °2 gives Missouri an additional incentive
to restrict the defenses available to manufacturers. Often it is difficult to
stand one's ground in the face of sweeping changes all around. Judge Wel-
liver, in his dissent in Lippard, seems to be persuaded by the fact that twenty-
eight of the "more influential jurisdictions" have applied comparative fault
to strict products liability, whereas only six jurisdictions have held to the
contrary.'10 The short answer to this is that what is good for these twenty-
eight jurisdictions may not be right for Missouri.
Comparative fault is not the ideal solution Daly and its progeny pro-
pose it to be." 4 No longer will the costs of full compensation be spread
throughout society. Instead, the total cost to manufacturers will be reduced at
the expense of injured plaintiffs whose recovery turns on the "necessarily
fortuitous, conjectural and haphazard determinations to be made by juries" 0 5
who are trying to compare conduct that cannot fairly be compared.' °6 Such
a result is contrary to Missouri's strong policy in favor of socializing the
total loss suffered by plaintiffs from defective products. 0 7 This reason alone
would seem sufficient grounds to justify the Lippard decision.
Additionally, the policy of encouraging safer products is also severely
hindered if comparative fault is allowed as a defense.'08 Manufacturers will
be slow to spend the money needed to improve the product's safety.1' 9 Con-
101. Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Mo. 1969).
102. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
103. Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., 715 S.W.2d 491, 502 (Mo. 1986) (en banc)
(Welliver, J., dissenting).
104. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
105. Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 757, 575 P.2d 1162, 1181,
144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 399 (1978) (Jefferson, J., dissenting).
106. See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 49 and accompanying text; see also Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at
756-57, 575 P.2d at 1181, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 395 (Jefferson, J., dissenting); Butaud
v. Suburban Marine and Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 47 (Alaska 1976) (Burke,
J., dissenting). Both Justice Jefferson in Daly and Justice Burke in Butaud felt the
merging of comparative fault and strict products liability frustrated the policy of
socializing losses caused by defective products.
108. See generally supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
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sumers reacting to products as directed by defendants' marketing campaigns
may have their recoveries reduced because this conduct was unreasonable." 0
Manufacturers may lose their incentive to prevent foreseeable misjudgment.'
When considering whether to ease the burden on manufacturers in prod-
ucts liability cases, it is crucial that one keep in mind exactly what products
liability law addresses. Products liability deals with defective products. As
Justice Mosk reminded us in his Daly dissent:
The defective product is comparable to a time bomb ready to explode;
it maims its victims indiscriminately, the righteous and the evil, the careful
and the careless. Thus when a faulty design or otherwise defective product
is involved, the litigation should not be diverted to consideration of the
negligence of the plaintiff. The liability issues are simple: Was the product
or its design faulty, did the defendant inject the defective product into the
stream of commerce, and did the defect cause the injury?112
With this in mind, the Missouri Supreme Court properly held that ordinary
contributory negligence by a consumer should not be even a partial defense
in products liability cases.
110. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
112. Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 760, 575 P.2d at 1183, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 401 (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
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